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Editor’s Note: ABI’s Bankruptcy
Litigation Committee sponsored and conducted ABI’s Third Annual Bankruptcy
Law Student Writing Competition during
the first semester of 2011. Fourteen law
students submitted papers for the competition, which focused on bankruptcy
sales, plan confirmation and other topics that involve jurisdiction, litigation or
evidence in the bankruptcy courts. All
papers were reviewed by a law professor prior to submission and were then
judged by a panel of bankruptcy experts,
including a bankruptcy judge, former
U.S. Trustee and several practitioners,
on style, substance and relevance. Saul
Ehrenpreis of the University of Maryland
School of Law won first place in the competition. As the winner of the competition, he received a $1,000 cash prize, a
one-year ABI membership and publication of the paper in the Journal. Prior
to submission, Prof. Michelle Harner
of the University of Maryland School of
Law reviewed Ehrenpreis’ paper.

T

he core of many companies’
business model depends heavily on access to a trademark
license. Unfortunately, despite possessing a license and turning a profit,
some of these companies run into difficulties and are forced to file for chapter 11. This article analyzes the legal
issues faced by a company in this situation.1 First, it explores the existing tension at the intersection of bankruptcy
and trademark law, then discusses the
three approaches courts have taken to
resolving this tension. It concludes
1 Throughout this article, the term “debtor” will refer to the licensee who
needs to continue performing under the license in order to have any
chance at successfully completing a chapter 11 reorganization.
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with the proposal that only one of these
approaches appropriately balances the
competing interests at stake.

Conflict between Trademark
Licenses and Bankruptcy Law
11 U.S.C. § 365(n)

In 1988, Congress enacted the
Intellectual Property Licenses in
Bankruptcy Act (IPLBA), 2 which
was intended to resolve the issues of

The purpose of
§ 365(n) was “to
make clear that the
rights of an intellectual property
licensee to use the
licensed property
cannot be unilaterally cut off as a result
Saul Ehrenpreis
of the rejection of
the license pursuant
to § 365 in the event of the [licensee’s]
bankruptcy.”5 Prior to enactment of the
IPLBA, many court decisions read the
Bankruptcy Code to allow an IP licensor
to strip the licensee of its ability to continue using the licensed property “under
the auspices of rejecting the license as
an executory contract.”6 Congress determined that this result was counter to the
purposes of bankruptcy law and implemented the IPLBA.7

Special Feature
intellectual property (IP) licensees in
bankruptcy. The IPLBA amended the
Bankruptcy Code to include § 365(n),
which “allows a...licensee to override
the...licensor’s option to reject the intellectual property license agreement.” 3
Under this section, a debtor licensee
can override the licensor’s objection
to assumption despite the nondebtor
licensor determining that objection to
continued performance of the license is
beneficial. After overriding the objection, the licensee continues completing
all duties under the license, including
making all necessary payments.4
2 Intellectual Property in Bankruptcy Act, Pub. L. No. 100-506; 102 Stat.
2538 (1988); John P. Musone, “Note & Comment: Crystallizing the
Intellectual Property Licenses in Bankruptcy Act: A Proposed Solution to
Achieve Congress’ Intent,” 13 Bank. Dev. J. 509, 509-10 (1997).
3 Musone, supra, n. 2, at 510.
4 Id.

Section 365(n) accomplishes
Congress’ goal of reversing results similar to those in previous cases for nearly all kinds of IP. However, § 365(n),
although intended to provide assistance
to all IP licensees, provides no assistance to trademark licensees.8 The text of
§ 365(n) states that it applies where “the
5 S. Rep. No. 100-505 at 1 (1988).
6 Id. at 2. Unfortunately, the Code does not define what qualifies a
contract as an executory. In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 962 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 365(a)). The leading definition states
that “a contract under which the obligations of both the bankrupt and
the other party to the contract are so unperformed that the failure of
either to complete performance would constitute a material breach”
is an executory contract. Vernon Countryman, “Executory Contracts
in Bankruptcy: Part I,” 57 Minn. L. Rev. 439, 460 (1973). Under this
definition, licenses to use IP are generally held to be executory. See,
e.g., In re CFLC Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996) (patent licenses);
In re HQ Global Holdings Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 511 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003)
(trademark licenses); In re Patient Educ. Media Inc., 210 B.R. 237, 241
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (copyright licenses).
7 S. Rep. No. 100-505 at 1 (1988).
8 In re Exide Techs., 340 B.R. 222, 249-50 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006).
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debtor is a [licensee] of a right to intellectual property.”9 On its face, the statute
appears to cover trademark licensees as
trademarks are typically included in the
definition of IP. However, this is not the
case in the Code.10
The bankruptcy definition of IP can
be found in 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A). 11
Noticeably absent from this definition
are trademarks, which are not afforded
the protections of § 365(n). Thus, if a
trademark licensee wants to continue to
use a license after the nondebtor licensor objects to assumption of the license
in bankruptcy, the licensee is forced to
rely on the courts’ interpretations of 11
U.S.C. § 365(c)(1).
11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1)

Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code
generally allows a debtor in possession
(DIP) to assume licenses that were the
property of the debtor prior to bankruptcy. 12 However, subsection (c)(1) provides an exception to this ability. Section
365(c)(1), in relevant part, states:
(c) The trustee may not assume
or assign any executory contract
or unexpired lease of the debtor,
whether or not such contract or
lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of
duties, if—
(1)(A) applicable law
excuses a party...from
accepting performance
from...an entity other
than the debtor or the
debtor in possession...and
(B) such party does not
consent to such assumption or assignment.13
This section operates as an exception
to the rule that a trustee or DIP may not
assume executory contracts, such as trademark licenses, if the licensor objects.14
The DIP’s ability to use this exception
turns on the court’s interpretation of §
365(c)(1).15 Specifically, this determination centers around the interpretation
of the word “or” in subsection (1)(B).16
9 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2006) (emphasis added).
10 See In re Exide Techs., 340 B.R. at 249-50; In re HQ Global Holdings
Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (finding that trade
names, trademarks and other proprietary marks are not included within
definition of IP); Raima UK Ltd. v. Centura Software Corp. (In re Centura
Software Corp.), 281 B.R. 660, 669-70 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (noting that “Congress has...expressly withheld § 365(n) protection from
rejected executory trademark licenses”).
11 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2006).
12 N.C.P. Mktg. Group Inc. v. BG Star Prods., 129 S.Ct. 1577, 1577 (2009).
13 Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
14 Laura D. Steele, “Comment, Actual or Hypothetical: Determining the
Proper Test for Trademark Licensee Rights in Bankruptcy,” 14 Marq.
Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 411, 430 (2010) (citing In re NCP Mktg. Group Inc.,
337 B.R. 230, 233 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2005)).
15 Id. at 430-31.
16 Jay R. Indyke, et al., “Ending the ‘Hypothetical’ vs. ‘Actual’ Test Debate:
A New Way to Read Section 365(c)(1),” 16 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. 2 Art. 3,
p. 1 (2007).

Some courts read the “or” as disjunctive,17
some read it as the functional equivalent
of “and,”18 and a third, more recent group
states that the issue does not center around
the meaning of “or” but rather centers
around whether Congress intentionally
included only trustee and not DIP in the
opening sentence of § 365(c).19

Interpretations of § 365(c)(1)

The circuits are decidedly split as
to which of the three interpretations of
§ 365(c)(1) is correct,20 and resolving
this split is an issue that the Supreme
Court believes should be completed as
soon as possible.21 The three tests are
known as the hypothetical, actual and
Footstar tests.
The Hypothetical Test

The hypothetical test was first
described in 1986 by the Third Circuit in
In re West Electronics.22 In a bankruptcy
proceeding, West attempted to have the
court order the government to allow it to
assume a license contract. 23 The bankruptcy court denied West’s motion to
assume based on the court’s reading of
§ 365(c)(1) as meaning “if nonbankruptcy law provides that the [licensor]
would have to consent to an assignment
of the West contract to a third party,
i.e., someone other than the debtor or
the DIP, then West, as the DIP, cannot
assume that contract.”24 Both the bankruptcy and district courts declined to
allow the government to object to performance of the license.25 On appeal, the
Third Circuit reversed the lower courts
and determined that the government
should have been able to object to performance under the license.26 The basis
for this decision was the court’s holding that “11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) creates a
hypothetical test—i.e., under the applicable law, could the government refuse
performance from an entity other than
the debtor or the DIP?”27
Since the Third Circuit’s ruling
in West Technologies, two additional
circuit courts and several bankruptcy
courts have adopted this hypotheti17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24
25
26
27

See infra Part II.a.
See infra Part II.b.
Indyke, et al., supra, n. 16 at 4.
Robert L. Eisenbach III, “The Section 365(C)(1)(A) Debate: ‘Actual’ or
‘Hypothetical’? A Circuit-by-Circuit Look,” (2007), http://bankruptcy.
cooley.com/Section_365_c__1__Chart(1).pdf.
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Breyer, stated in the Supreme
Court’s decision to deny review in N.C.P. Marketing: “The division in the
courts over the meaning of § 365(c)(1) is an important one to resolve.”
N.C.P. Mktg. Group Inc. v. BG Star Prods., 129 S.Ct. 1577, 1578 (2009).
In re West Electronics Inc., 852 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1988) (rejected by In re
James Cable Partners LP, 154 B.R. 813 (M.D. Ga. 1993)); Indyke, et al.,
supra, n. 6 at 3.
West, 852 F.2d at 79.
Id. at 83 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 82.
Id.
Id. at 83.

cal test. 28 These courts believe that
§ 365(c)(1)(B) should be read literally
and the “or” should be read as a disjunctive. Therefore, the debtor cannot assume
nor assign an executory contract when
the licensor objects to continued performance.29 The Ninth Circuit simply states
that § 365(c)(1)(B)’s language means
that “a [DIP] may assume an executory
contract only if hypothetically it [may]
assign that contract to a third party.” 30
If the DIP, hypothetically, could not
either assume or assign a license, then it
does not have the ability to assume the
license.31 This is true even if the DIP has
no intention of doing anything other than
assuming the license and continuing to
go about its business in order to complete
the reorganization plan.32
This strict fidelity to the language
of the statute is the main reason that
courts have adopted, and commentators
have supported, the hypothetical test.33
Proponents of the hypothetical test insist
that this reading makes the courts’ job
easier by removing other possible interpretations and results in more consistent
application of the law.34
While this fidelity is the only reason for adopting the hypothetical test,
there are many reasons to reject it. First,
this test can—and often does—produce
results that make the goals of bankruptcy
unattainable.35 Many companies in chapter 11 need to continue acting under certain licenses in order to survive. Under
the hypothetical test, these rights can
be taken away if the nondebtor licensor determines—in its business judgment—that continuing to perform under
the license would not be in the licensor’s
best interest.36 Secondly, when the licensor decides to object to assumption of the
license, it regains possession of a potentially valuable asset that it would not
have possessed if not for the objection. If
the licensee was performing well under
the license, the value of this license will
have risen since the execution of the
license agreement. The licensor will
now be able to license the use of its IP
for a higher fee, thus receiving a windfall
that it would not have had if not for the
28 See In re Footstar Inc., 323 B.R. 566, 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005);
see also In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2004) (adopting
hypothetical test); In re Catapult Entertainment Inc., 165 F.3d 747
(9th Cir. 1999) (same); In re Neuhoff Farms Inc., 258 B.R. 343, 350
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2000) (same); In re TechDyn Systems Corp., 235
B.R. 857 (same).
29 Indyke, et al., supra, n. 16 at 3.
30 N.C.P. Mktg. Group Inc. v. BG Star Prods., 129 S.Ct. 1577, 1577 (2009)
(citing In re Catapult Entertainment Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999)).
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Indyke, et al., supra, n. 16 at 3.
34 See id.
35 N.C.P. Mktg. Group, 129 S.Ct. at 1577.
36 Id.

44 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 400 • Alexandria, VA 22314 • (703) 739-0800 • Fax (703) 739-1060 • www.abiworld.org

objection permitted under the hypothetical test.37 Thus, although this test makes
the courts’ job easier, it frustrates the
purpose of chapter 11 and provides the
licensor with benefits to the detriment of
the licensee.
The Actual Test

One circuit court and “the great
majority of lower courts” reject the
hypothetical test in favor of the actual
test.38 This test reads § 365(c)(1)(B)’s
“assume or assign” language as “assume
and assign.” Thus, as long as the DIP
does not have any actual intention to
assign the license to a third party, it may
assume and continue performing under
the license.39 The seminal case regarding the actual test is Institut Pasteur v.
Cambridge Biotech Corp.40 According to
the First Circuit in Institut Pasteur:
Subsection...365(c)...
contemplate[s] a case-by-case
inquiry into whether the [licensor] actually was being forced
to accept performance under its
[license] from someone other than
the [licensee] with whom it originally contracted. Where the particular transaction envisions that
the debtor-in-possession would
assume and continue to perform
under [a license], the bankruptcy
court cannot simply presume as
a matter of law that the [DIP] is
a legal entity materially distinct
from the...debtor with whom the
nondebtor...contracted.41
Courts that have followed the First
Circuit and adopted the actual test look to
what the licensee actually plans to do with
the license rather than what the licensee
could hypothetically do under circumstances that may arise in the future. 42
Looking to what the licensee actually
intends to do allows the debtor licensee
to get the most value out of its licenses.
This ability to maximize the value greatly
increases the chances of successfully
completing a chapter 11 reorganization.
It also eliminates the unearned windfall
received by the nondebtor licensor under
the hypothetical test.43
Additionally, courts and commentators that support the actual test believe
that Congress did not intend for courts
37 Id.
38 In re Footstar Inc., 323 B.R. 566, 569 n. 2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); see
also Eisenbach, supra, n.20.
39 N.C.P. Mktg. Group, 129 S.Ct. at 1578 (applying actual test); In re
Catapult, 165 F.3d 747, 749 n. 2 (9th Cir. 1999) (collecting bankruptcy
court decisions favoring actual test).
40 Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489 (1st Cir
1997); Eisenbach, supra, n. 20.
41 Institut Pasteur, 104 F.3d at 493 (internal citations and quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
42 Indyke, et al., supra, n. 16, at 4.
43 Id.

to have to complete an abstract analysis in order to determine hypothetically
whether a debtor could assume or assign
a license. 44 Instead, these supporters
believe that Congress intended that the
courts complete a case-by-case inquiry
into the effects on the licensor and the
licensee of allowing the licensee to continue performance under the license.45
Although the actual test does not
force courts to determine what could
hypothetically occur and will not frustrate the purposes of chapter 11, it too
has drawbacks. The main criticism
is that the actual test is only able to
align with the goals of chapter 11 by
“departing from at least one interpretation of the plain text of the law.”46 This
criticism leaves the law open to debate
and asks for a different interpretation
of § 365(c)(1).
The Footstar Test

In 2005, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of New York
introduced a third method for evaluating the meaning of § 365(c)(1) in In
re Footstar Inc. 47 The court began by
stating that it agreed with courts that
follow the actual test when evaluating the assumption of licenses under
§ 365(c)(1).48 Despite the court agreeing
with the actual test, it believed there was
a better way to analyze the assumption
of licenses under § 365(c)(1) while coming to the same conclusion. 49 Section
365(c)(1) “can and should be construed
in accordance with its ‘plain meaning’ to
reach a conclusion which is entirely harmonious with both the objective sought
to be obtained in Section 365(c)(1) and
the overall objectives of the Bankruptcy
Code, without construing ‘or’ to mean
‘and.’” 50 This new test achieved the
results of the actual test while following
the literal reading of § 365(c)(1) used in
the hypothetical test.
This result was accomplished by
focusing on a different word, or lack
thereof, in the text of § 365(c)(1). “The
key word is ‘trustee.’ The statute does
not say that the debtor or [DIP] may
not assume or assign—the prohibition
applies on its face to the ‘trustee.’”51
Courts applying the actual and hypothetical tests read the term “trustee” in
§ 365(c)(1) as synonymous with DIP.
44 Id.
45 Summit Inv. & Development Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 613 (1st Cir. 1995).
46 N.C.P. Mktg. Group Inc. v. BG Star Prods., 129 S.Ct. 1577, 1578 (2009)
(citing In re Catapult, 165 F.3d 747, 751-55 (9th Cir. 1999)).
47 In re Footstar Inc., 323 B.R. 566, 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); Steele,
supra, n. 14, at 439.
48 In re Footstar Inc., 323 B.R. at 571.
49 Id. at 570.
50 Id.
51 Id.

Yet such a reading runs counter to the
plain meaning of the statute that proponents of the hypothetical test hang their
hats on. 52 Although DIPs and trustees
have many of the same rights under the
Code, “[n]owhere does the Bankruptcy
Code define trustee as synonymous with
debtor or [DIP].”53 In actuality, by referring separately to both a trustee and a
debtor (or DIP) within many provisions,
Congress indicated that the two terms
are meant to have different meanings.
This is perfectly demonstrated through
Congress’ careful attempt to specifically
include one term and not the other when
it amended § 365(c)(1) in 1984.54
Additionally, the difference between
a trustee and DIP is demonstrated
through the progression of a bankruptcy
case. A debtor remains in possession
“unless and until a trustee is appointed
by court order under Section 1104.” 55
If a trustee is appointed, he or she takes
possession of the debtor’s assets as well
as all of the debtor’s rights. The appointment of a trustee affects a statutory transfer of all property and rights from the
debtor to a third party, the trustee. Thus,
a DIP and trustee in a chapter 11 case are
different entities.56 Despite not explicitly
addressing § 1107(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code, the Footstar court sufficiently
explained why a trustee and DIP, while
possessing many of the same powers, are
in fact distinct entities.57 This is contradictory to the premise that the courts following the hypothetical and actual tests
start from—that the term “trustee” in
§ 365(c)(1) is meant to include a DIP.58
This new test states that the term
“trustee,” as used in § 365(c)(1), does
not include within its meaning DIP.
52 Id. at 570-71.
53 Id. at 571.
54 Id. The 1984 amendment, which added the phrase “debtor or the debtor in possession” to § 365(c), appears to state that the DIP can “stand
in the shoes of the debtor” and continue to perform under the executory
contract, but that any other entity, including a bankruptcy trustee, is not
able to continue performance. As such, unless Congress intended to
permit a DIP to assume otherwise nonassignable contracts, it appears
that the 1984 amendment would serve no purpose. Thomas M. Mackey,
“Post-Footstar Balancing: Toward Better Construction of §365(c)(1) and
Beyond,” 84 Am. Bankr. L. J. 405, 426 (2010).
55 In re Footstar Inc., 323 B.R. at 571.
56 Id.
57 See supra, n. 51-56 and accompanying text. For additional evidence
that, despite the language of § 1107(a), a trustee and DIP are distinct
entities, see also 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (explicitly referring to trustee and
DIP separately); In re Aerobox Composite Structures LLC, 373 B.R.
135, 141-42 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2007) (adopting Footstar reading that
despite § 1107(a), trustee and DIP are distinct entities); In re Adelphia
Commc’ns Corp., 359 B.R. 65, 72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) (following
Footstar analysis that trustee and DIP are distinct and further explaining that since debtor and DIP are essentially same, trustee and DIP
must be distinct entities); David R. Kuney, “Restructuring Dilemmas for
the High Technology Licensee: Will ‘Plain Meaning’ Bring Order to the
Chaotic Bankruptcy Law of Assumption and Assignment of Technology
Licenses?,” 44 Gonz. L. Rev. 123, 154-55 (2008/2009) (examining
Footstar reasoning and distinction between DIP and trustee); Mackey,
supra, n. 54 at n. 115 (“It would be more precise not to say that debtor
in possession stands in the shoes of the debtor, but rather to note that
debtor in possession is the debtor ‘in possession’ of additional trusteelike functions, rights, powers and duties.”).
58 In re Footstar Inc., 323 B.R. at 571 (citing In re Catapult Entertainment
Inc., 165 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1999)).
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Thus “the proscription of assumption and
assignment is limited to situations where
a trustee, rather than a [DIP], seeks to
assume an executory contract.”59 A DIP
is prohibited from assigning its executory
contracts or licenses because this assignment would force the licensor to accept
performance from a third party other
than the debtor. However, the debtor can
assume the executory contract or license
because “unlike a bankruptcy trustee, the
DIP is ‘not an entity other than itself.’”60
Therefore, the Footstar test achieves the
same results of the actual test while eliminating the objections to the actual test.

Which Test Is Correct?

“[T]he basic policy goal in place in
[§] 365 is attempting to allow the debtor
to realize the correct value of its estate,
while also providing some protection to
the nondebtor.”61 Each of the three tests
for analyzing § 365(c)(1) helps and hinders the ability to meet this goal.
The hypothetical test stays true to the
rules of statutory construction. It reads
the statute literally and allows all persons involved to know what is expected. However, this positive aspect of the
hypothetical test is clearly outweighed
by its many disadvantages. First, the
hypothetical test requires that the court
undergo a difficult, and sometimes complicated, abstract analysis of what the
debtor hypothetically could or could not
do. This removes the clarity of the literal
reading and forces all involved to guess
what the court will determine.
Next, the hypothetical test can, and
usually does, utterly frustrate the purpose of chapter 11, which occurs because
some executory contracts or licenses that
are trying to be assumed are the lifeblood
of the entity in chapter 11. If the entity
cannot assume and continue to perform
under the license, then there is no point
in chapter 11 because the company will
not be able to reorganize successfully
and all involved would have been better
served by chapter 7 liquidation.
Third, the hypothetical test can provide the nondebtor licensor with a windfall that it would not have had outside
of bankruptcy and comes from the nondebtor’s ability to deny assumption. By
denying assumption, the license is eliminated and the nondebtor can once again
59 Mark G. Douglas, “IP Perspective: Actual Test and Footstar Approach
Govern DIP’s Ability to Assume Patent and Technology License,” 86
Corporate Counsel’s Licensing Letter, May 2008, at 1, 3, www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/5c89e094-3cff-4a51-a426-9f9c984b6980/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/77620fab-2293-4010-928fa86f3dfc87bf/40598776indesign.pdf.
60 Id.
61 Pa. Elec. Co. v. United Foundry Co., No 06-200, 2009 US. Dist LEXIS
80399 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2009).

market the license for sale. If the license
is profitable, the nondebtor can negotiate
more favorable terms in a new license,
either with the debtor (because the debtor
needs the license to survive) or with one
or more new third parties (because the
license is now more desirable).
Finally, although this is the test that
has been adopted by the most circuit
courts, it is not the most-used test within
the courts that have the greatest expertise
in bankruptcy—the federal bankruptcy
courts.62 This fact, along with the other
ways in which the hypothetical test’s
results are contrary to the goals of the
bankruptcy system, indicates that the
hypothetical test should not be used.
The actual test has more positive
characteristics than the hypothetical test,
but it is not without flaws. The primary
positive aspect is that the actual test follows the purpose of chapter 11 by allowing a debtor to continue its business and
successfully complete reorganization.
It accomplishes this by allowing the
debtor to continue performing under the
license. Without the ability to continue
performance, the debtor would not be
able to complete its reorganization and
all creditors would leave funds on the
table, because property in a chapter 11
is usually more valuable as used by the
debtor than if sold on the open market
during chapter 7 liquidation.
A second positive aspect of the actual
test is that it focuses on what the debtor
actually wants to do. This has two beneficial impacts: (1) Courts simply need
to determine what the debtor wants to
do and do not need to undertake a complicated analysis to discover hypothetically what the debtor could do; and (2)
if the debtor changes its mind during or
post-bankruptcy, then the actual test will
block the assignment. Finally, this is the
test that is followed by the majority of
the federal bankruptcy courts.63
Despite these positive results, the
actual test is not perfect. For example,
it departs from the plain text of the law,
which forces the courts to determine
what Congress intended when it drafted
§ 365(c)(1) rather than reading the text
literally as written. Similarly, it forces
the courts to undertake an expensive,
expertise-requiring case-by-case analysis. If there was a bright-line rule, the
courts’ decisions would be easier and all
involved could more generally predict
the outcome. However, the simplicity of
a bright-line rule is a result that cannot

properly be achieved in all areas of the
law. Although the positive aspects of the
actual test outweigh the negative, it is
still not the best interpretation.
The test outlined in Footstar is clearly the best of the three available interpretations of § 365(c)(1). It combines
the positive aspects of the hypothetical
and actual tests, while eliminating most
of the negatives. The Footstar test follows the literal reading of “assume or
assign,” like the hypothetical test. It also
allows the debtor to assume a license
and accomplish the goal of chapter 11.
Additionally, the Footstar test does not
permit the nondebtor to receive a windfall that it would not have been able
to without bankruptcy. It also follows
Congress’ intentions by using a case-bycase analysis and prevents a third party
from taking over a license without the
approval of the nondebtor licensor.
Moreover, the Footstar test is the
most consistent and straightforward of
the three tests because it reads the text of
§ 365(c)(1) literally and avoids the confusion about whether a trustee and DIP
are one and the same. The only negative
aspect is that it has not yet gained traction in the courts. Only time will tell if
courts and commentators alike see the
benefits of the Footstar test and begin to
follow it. n
Reprinted with permission from the ABI
Journal, Vol. XXX, No. 5, June 2011.
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62 See supra, n. 38 and accompanying text.
63 See supra, n. 38 and accompanying text.
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